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There is a rich scholarly literature on sovereign default on external debt. Comparatively little is known
about sovereign defaults on domestic debt. Even today, cross-country data on domestic public debt
remains curiously exotic, particularly prior to the 1980s. We have filled this gap in the literature by
compiling a database on central government public debt (external and domestic). The data span 1914
to 2007 for most countries, reaching back into the nineteenth century for many. Our findings on debt
sustainability, sovereign defaults, the temptation to inflate, and the hierarchy of creditors only scratch
the surface of what the domestic public debt data can reveal. First, domestic debt is big -- for the 64
countries for which we have long time series, domestic debt accounts for almost two-thirds of total
public debt. For most of the sample, this debt carries a market interest rate (except for the financial
repression era between WWII and financial liberalization). Second, the data go a long ways toward
explaining the puzzle of why countries so often default on their external debts at seemingly low debt
thresholds. Third, domestic debt has largely been ignored in the vast empirical work on inflation. In
fact, domestic debt (a significant portion of which is long term and non-indexed) is often much larger
than the monetary base in the run-up to high inflation episodes. Last, the widely-held view that domestic
residents are strictly junior to external creditors does not find broad support.
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This paper is as much an exercise in archeology as in economics. We have 
unearthed a vast trove of historical time-series data on domestic public debt for 64 
countries ranging back to 1914.  Our key sources are publications of the now-defunct 
League of Nations, including updates until the early 1980s by its successor, the United 
Nations.  We also make use of national sources and work by scholars to supplement, 
cross-check and extend the data, both back before 1914 for some countries plus forward 
to the present for most.  Although it may come as quite a surprise to most readers that 
historical time series on domestic debt should be exotic for so many countries, it is. This 
is in contrast to external sovereign debt, on which there is a vast literature.
1  We are not 
aware of any academic or policy study that uses similar data, certainly not one 
encompassing such a long time period and so many countries. 
Indeed, historical data on domestic (internal) government debt has been ignored 
for so long that many observers have come to believe that the issuance boom of the early 
2000s is something entirely new and different.
2  This perspective is based on the belief 
that, historically, domestic government debt played only a minor role in the public 
finances of most developing and post-conflict countries.
3  The new data set thoroughly 
dispels this notion.  Our key findings can be summarized as follow: 
                                                 
1 Domestic public debt is issued under home legal jurisdiction.  In most countries, over most of their 
history, it has been denominated in the local currency and held mainly by residents.  By the same token, the 
overwhelming majority of external public debt—debt under the legal jurisdiction of foreign governments—
has been denominated in foreign currency and held by foreign residents.  Theoretical models that try to 
explain default include Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989).  Empirical studies of 
external debt that range from in-depth case studies (such as the classics by Winkler, 1928, or Wynne, 1951) 
to systematic cross-country analysis (Bordo and Eichengreen, 1999, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006 
and Tomz, 2007).  Eichengreen (1991) provides an authoritative summary of the early literature.  
2 See for example, the IADB 2006 annual report, or the April 2007 IMF Global Financial Stability Report. 
3 See for example, Eichengreen and Hausman (1999), who mainly focus on the post 1980 period.   2
First, domestic debt is large—for the 64 countries for which we have long time 
series, domestic debt averages almost two-thirds of total public debt; for most of the 
sample these debts typically carried a market interest rate, except for the era of financial 
repression after World War II.  Second, recognizing the significance of domestic debt 
goes a long way toward explaining the puzzle of why many countries default on (or 
restructure) their external debts at seemingly low debt thresholds.  In fact, when 
heretofore ignored domestic debt obligations are taken into account, fiscal duress at the 
time of default is often revealed to be quite severe.
4  A third and related point is that 
domestic debt may also explain the paradox of why some governments seem to choose 
inflation rates far above any level that might be rationalized by seignorage revenues 
leveraged off the monetary base (e.g., as in Cagan’s classic, 1956, article on postwar 
hyperinflations).  Although domestic debt is largely ignored in the vast empirical 
literature on high and hyperinflation, we find that there are many cases where the hidden 
overhang of domestic public debt was at least the same order of magnitude as base 
money, and sometimes a large multiple.
5   
  
Last, our paper offers a first attempt to catalogue episodes of overt default on and 
rescheduling of domestic public debt across more than a century.  This phenomenon 
appears to be somewhat rarer than external default, but far too common to justify the 
extreme assumption that governments always honor the nominal face value of domestic 
debt.  When overt default on domestic debt does occur, it appears to occur under 
                                                 
4 This puzzling “debt intolerance” is examined by Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003). 
5 See Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002) for an excellent treatise on this subject (and the classic papers that 
are cited therein). A few theoretical treatments (for example Calvo, 1989) have recognized the potential 
significance of nominal domestic debt. Yet, since many researchers have long believed domestic debt to be 
relatively small and unimportant, the incentives to inflate it away have received scant attention in the 
empirical literature.     3
situations of greater duress than for pure external defaults—both in terms of an implosion 
of output and marked escalation of inflation.  It is important to note that we do not here 
catalogue episodes of major de facto partial defaults, say through a sharp unexpected 
increase in financial repression (e.g., of the type India and China still impose today). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Since our new public debt database is 
central to our analysis, we begin by describing some of its key features.  Specifically, we 
focus on four broad areas: the composition of public debt (domestic versus external); the 
structure of domestic debt by maturity; the interest rates on domestic and external debt; 
and, lastly, what little is known of its currency composition.  Further details are discussed 
in the Appendices. 
Section III introduces our approach to cataloguing defaults on domestic public 
debt.  Such defaults typically leave few footprints in the mainstream international or 
business press and are therefore much more difficult to detect than external defaults 
(which our database comprehensively catalogues).   In section IV, we look at the 
potential role of domestic debt during episodes of external default. Section V explores the 
connection between high inflation and domestic debt in emerging markets and post-
conflict countries.  Section VI attempts to shed light on the issue of who gets heavily 
defaulted on more often, domestic or foreign residents. 
In our conclusion, we raise the question of whether the difficulties in unearthing 
domestic public debt data should be addressed by an international agency that coordinates 
greater transparency across sovereign debt issuers.  The League of Nations once enforced 
such reporting, although the results were under-publicized and subsequently forgotten.  
Should not today’s multilateral lending institutions, such as the International Monetary   4
Fund and the World Bank, be able to do the same today, if not better?  The IMF’s Special 
Data Dissemination Standard  (SDDS) takes a step in that direction but only the most 
recent figures appear and debt categories vary substantially by country. Absent a 
borrowing history, it is impossible to conduct any meaningful credit analysis. 
II.  Domestic Public Debt: Some Features 
 
Unquestionably, the single most remarkable feature of our cross-country data set 
is its apparent uniqueness.  Until now, obtaining comprehensive long-term time series on 
domestic debt has been extremely difficult for most countries.  Even for the relatively 
rich countries, the OECD database only goes back to 1980, and constructing long-term 
time series from national sources is far less straightforward than one might imagine. 
Outside the OECD countries, the dearth of data is stunning. 
Only recently, a few groups of scholars have begun constructing data for the 
contemporary period. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) draw on national sources to 
develop a data set for selected developing countries and emerging markets covering the 
years 1990 to 2002.  More recently, Jeanne and Guscina (2006) provide detailed data on 
domestic debt for nineteen important emerging markets for 1980 to 2005.  Cowan, Levy-
Yeyati, Panizza and Sturzenegger (2006) provide data for all the countries in the Western 
Hemisphere from 1980 (or 1990) to 2004.
6 
Figure 1 plots the share of domestic debt in total public debt for 1900 to 2006, 
which averaged between 40 and 80 percent of total debt. See data appendix for data 
availability by country.   The figures in this chart are simple averages across countries, 
but these ratios are also fairly representative for many of the emerging markets in the 
                                                 
6 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) describe a companion database covering a broad range of related 
variables, including external debt, that we also draw upon here. 
   5
sample (including now-rich countries when they were still emerging markets, such as 
Greece, Austria, and Spain).
7  As the figure underscores, the data set here contains 
significant representation from every continent, not just for a handful of Latin American 
and European countries, as in most of the external debt literature. 
Of course, the experience is diverse.  For advanced economies, domestic debt 
accounts for the lion’s share of public-sector liabilities.  At the other extreme, in some 
emerging markets, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, domestic debt markets were dealt a 
brutal blow by many governments’ propensity to inflate—or hyperinflate. For instance, in 
the years following the hyperinflation of 1989 to 1990, domestic debt only accounted for  
10 to 20 percent of Peru’s public debt.  Yet, this was not always so.  As with many other 
countries in Latin America, the early (end of World War I) entries of the League of 
Nations data show that Peru’s domestic debt then accounted for about two-thirds of 
public-sector debt.  Indeed, the share was even higher in the 1950s, when the world’s 
financial centers were not engaged in much external lending.   
In addition to showing that the debt is large, the data also dispel the belief that 
until recently, emerging markets (and developing countries) had never been able to 
borrow long term.  As Figure 2 shows, long-term debt constitutes a large share of the 
total debt stock over a significant part of the sample, at least for the period 1914 to 1959. 
(Over this sub-period, the League of Nations/UN database provides considerable detail 
on maturity structure.)  It may come as a surprise to many readers (as it did to these 
authors) that modern bias towards short-term debt is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
evidently a product of the “inflation fatigue” of the 1970s and 1980s.  
                                                 
7 Domestic public debt has never amounted to much in a few Latin American countries (Uruguay 
stands out in this regard), and public debt markets are virtually nonexistent in the CFA African countries 




Domestic Public Debt as a Share of Total Debt












































Sources: See Appendix II for domestic debt data; see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) for external debt data.   7
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Nor is the fact that many emerging markets are now paying market-oriented 
interest rates on domestic debt new.  Of course, during the post–World War II era, many 
governments did repress domestic financial markets, with low deposit rate ceilings and 
high bank reserve requirements, among other devices. But in fact, interest rate data for 
the first half of the twentieth century shows that financial repression was neither so strong 
nor so universal.  As Table 1 shows for the years 1928–1946, the period over which we 
have the best documentation, interest rates on domestic and external debt issues were 
relatively similar, supporting the notion that the debt was market determined. 
A final issue is inflation or foreign currency indexation.  Until very recently, most 
observers held that domestic public debt was mostly non-indexed local currency 
obligations.  Most externally issued emerging market public debt was similarly viewed as    8
Table 1.  Interest Rates on Domestic and External Debt: 1928–1946 
Country   Range of interest rates (in percent)  
  Domestic debt issues  External debt issues 
Argentina  3–6  3 ½–4 ½ 
Australia  2–4  3 3/8 –5 
Austria 4  ½–6  5 
Belgium 3  ½–5  3–7 
Bolivia ¼  –  8  6–8 
Brazil 4–7  4–7 
Bulgaria 4–6½  7–7½ 
Canada 1–5½  1  ¼  –5½ 
Chile 1–8  4  ½–7 
Colombia 3–10  3–6 
Costa Rica  6  5–7½ 
Denmark  2 ½–5  4 ½–6 
Ecuador 3  4–8 
Egypt  2 ½–4 ½  3 ½–4  
Finland 4–5½  2  ½–7 
Germany  3 ½–7  5 ½–6 
Greece 3–9  3–10 
Hungary  3 ½–5  3 –7 ½ 
India  3–5 ½  3–5 ½ 
Italy  3 ½–5  No external debt 
Japan 3  ½–5  4–6½ 
Netherlands  2 ½–6  No external debt 
New Zealand  2 ½–4   2 ½–5 
Nicaragua 5  4–5 
Poland 3–7  3–7 
Portugal 2.1–7  3–4 
Romania 3  ½–5  4–7 
South Africa  3½–6  3½–6 
Spain 3  ½–6  3–4 
Sweden  2 ½–4 ½  No external debt 
Thailand  2 ½–4 ½  4 ½–7 
Turkey 2½–5  ½  6½–7½ 
United Kingdom  1½ –4  No marketable external debt 
United States  1½–2½  No external debt 
Uruguay 5–7  3  ½–6 
Venezuela 3  3 
Notes: These are rates on domestic long-term debt, as it facilitates comparisons to external debt, which has 
a similar maturity profile.  The higher interest rates are the most representative. 
Source:  United Nations (1948). 
 
foreign currency denominated.
8  Indeed, many observers viewed Mexico’s famous 
issuance of dollar-linked domestic debt in the early 1990s (the so-called tesobonos) as a 
                                                 
8 It should also be noted that until the past ten to fifteen years, most countries’ external debt was largely 
public debt.   Private external borrowing has become more significant only over the past couple decades; 
see Prasad et al. (2003). Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008) develop a model of the relationship between 
private debt and external government default.   
   9
major innovation.  In reality, Argentina issued domestic government bonds in the late 
1800s that were denominated in pound sterling, and Thailand issued dollar-linked 
domestic debt in the 1960s (See Appendix Table 4 for sources).
9   
We summarize by noting that for most countries over most of history (notably 
including emerging markets), domestic debt has been large and highly significant.  
Nothing about the maturity structure or interest rates paid on these debts lends 
justification to the common practice of ignoring them in calculations of debt 
sustainability or inflation stability.  
We acknowledge that our data set has important limitations.  First, the data 
generally cover only central government debt.  Of course, it would be desirable to have 
long time series on consolidated government debt, including state and local debt and 
guaranteed debt for quasi-public agencies. Furthermore, many central banks across the 
world issue debt on their own, often to sterilize foreign exchange intervention (See 
Calvo, 1991, on these “perilous” practices).  Adding such data, of course, would only 
expand the perception of how important domestic public debt has been.  
We now take up some important potential applications of this data. 
III.  Cataloguing Defaults on Domestic Public Debt 
Theoretical models contain a wide range of assumptions about domestic public 
debt.  The overwhelming majority of models simply assume that debt is always honored.  
These include models where deficit policy is irrelevant due to Ricardian equivalence 
(Barro, 1976), where domestic public debt is a key input in price-level determination 
through the government’s budget constraint (Woodford, 1995), and where generations 
                                                 
9 Of course, during the early years of the interim war period, many countries pegged their currencies to gold 
(See Appendix Table 3).   10
overlap (Diamond, 1965).  There is a small literature that aims to understand why 
governments honor domestic debt at all (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000, or Kotlikoff, 
Persson, and Svensson, 1988).  However, the general assumption throughout the 
literature is, whereas governments may inflate away debt, outright defaults on domestic 
public debt are extremely rare.  This is in stark contrast to the literature on external public 
debt, where the government’s incentive to default is one of the main focuses of inquiry. 
  In fact, our reading of the historical record is that overt de jure defaults on 
domestic public debt, while less common than external defaults, are hardly rare.  Our data 
set includes 68 cases of overt default (compared to 250 post-1800 external debt defaults).  
These de jure defaults took place via a potpourri of mechanisms, ranging from forcible 
conversions, to lower coupon rates, to unilateral reduction of principal (sometimes in 
conjunction with a currency conversion), to suspensions of payments.  Appendix Table 3 
lists these episodes.  
As we have already emphasized, our catalogue of domestic defaults is almost 
certainly a lower bound, as domestic defaults are far more difficult to detect than defaults 
on international debt.  Even the widespread defaults on domestic debt during the 1930s 
Great Depression in both advanced and developing economies are not well documented.  
As a more recent example, consider Argentina.  Between 1980 and 2001, Argentina 
defaulted three times on its domestic debt.  The two defaults that coincided with defaults 
in external debt (1982 and 2001) did attract considerable international attention.  
However, the large-scale 1989 default, which did not involve a new default on external 
debt, is scarcely known outside Argentina.   
   11
  Why would a government refuse to pay its domestic public debt in full when it 
can simply inflate the problem away?   One answer, of course, is that inflation causes 
distortions, especially to the banking system and the financial sector.  Sometimes, the 
government may view repudiation as the lesser evil.  The potential costs of inflation are 
especially problematic when the debt is relatively short term or indexed, since the 
government then has to inflate much more aggressively to achieve a significant real 
reduction in debt service payments.  In other cases, such as the United States during the 
Great Depression, default (by abrogation of the gold clause in 1933) was a precondition 
for reinflating the economy through expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. 
Of course, there are other forms of de facto default (besides inflation).  The 
combination of heightened financial repression with rises in inflation was an especially 
popular form of default from the 1960s to the early 1980s.  Brock (1989) makes the point 
that inflation and reserve requirements are positively correlated, particularly in Africa and 
Latin America.
10  Interest rate ceilings combined with inflation spurts are also common.  
For example, during the 1972–1976 external debt rescheduling in India, interest rates 
(interbank) in India were 6.6 and 13.5 percent in 1973 and 1974, while inflation spurted 
to 21.2 and 26.6 percent. These episodes of de facto default through financial repression 
are not listed among our de jure credit-event dating. Only to the extent that inflation 
exceeds the 20 percent threshold we use to define an inflation crisis, do they count at 
all.
11 
                                                 
10 Average reserve requirements for developing countries in his 1960 to early 1980s sample ran at about 
0.25, more than three times the average for advanced economies. 
11 Another subtle type of default is illustrated by the Argentine government’s treatment of its inflation-
indexed debt in 2007.  Most impartial observers agree that Argentina’s official inflation rate considerably 
understates actual inflation because of government manipulation. This represents a partial default on index-  12
 
  Clearly, the assumption embedded in many theoretical models that governments 
always honor the nominal face value of debt is a significant overstatement, particularly 
for emerging markets past and present.  Nevertheless, we would also caution against 
reaching the opposite extreme conclusion, that governments can ignore powerful 
domestic stakeholders and simply default at will (de jure or de facto) on domestic debt.  
We will now proceed to explore some implications of the overhang of large domestic 
debt on external default and inflation. 
IV. Domestic Debt and External Default: The Missing Link 
We begin by revisiting the conventional wisdom on external debt default and its 
implications for debt sustainability exercises and debt default thresholds.  Indeed, in the 
250 external debt default episodes in our database, it is clear that domestic debt loomed 
large across the vast majority of them.  Table 2 gives the ratio of both external debt and 
total debt (including domestic and external liabilities) relative to government revenues on 
the eve of many of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ most notable defaults. We 
normalize debt by government revenues because data on nominal GDP is sketchy or 
nonexistent for the nineteenth-century default episodes. (For many countries, standard 
sources such as Maddison, 2004, do not provide anything close to a continuous time 
series for GDP for the nineteenth century.)  Exports, which usually have longer time 
series, are not the obvious benchmark once domestic debt is added to the calculus of debt 
sustainability. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
linked debt by any reasonable measure, and it affects a large number of bondholders.  Yet, Argentina’s de 
facto domestic bond default has not registered heavily in the external press or with rating agencies.  
   13
Table 2. Debt Ratios at the Time of Default: Selected Episodes 
Country  Year of default  External public debt/ 
revenue 
Total  public debt/ 
revenue 
Mexico 1827  1.55  4.20 
Spain 1877  4.95  15.83 
Argentina 1890  4.42  12.46 
Germany 1932  0.64  2.43 
China 1939  3.10  8.96 
Turkey 1978  1.38  2.69 
Mexico 1982  3.25  5.06 
Brazil 1983  0.83  1.98 
Philippines 1983  0.23  1.25 
South Africa  1985  0.09  1.32 
Russia 1998  3.90  4.95 
Pakistan 1998  3.32  6.28 
Argentina 2001  1.59  2.62 
Sources: See Data Appendices I and II in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
Looking more broadly at our the sample, Figure 4 is based on the 89 episodes of 
external default over the period 1827 to 2003 where we have full data on external debt, 
total debt, and revenues.  In all regions except Latin America, external debt accounts for 
less than half of total debt during the year a country defaults on external debt; for Latin 
America, the average ratio is higher, but still only 60 percent. 
Thus, uncovering data on domestic debt suggests at least a partial answer to one 
of the most basic puzzles in the entire literature on international debt, emphasized by 
Bulow and Rogoff (1987) among others: Why do emerging market governments tend to 
default at such stunningly low levels of debt repayments and debts to GDP?  Reinhart, 
Rogoff and Savastano (2003), for example, present evidence that “serial defaulters” tend 
to default at ratios of debt to GDP that are below the euro area’s “Maastricht Treaty” 
upper bound of 60 percent. In fact, taking into account domestic public debt, the anomaly 
largely disappears.   14
























Figure 4 gives a different perspective on the data by providing the frequency 
distribution of external debt to GDP and total debt to GDP across all the external debt 
episodes in our sample for which we have full data.  As the figure illustrates, external 
debt to government revenue ratios are massed at a much smaller average than total debt 
to government revenue ratios during the year of an external default, with a mean of 2.38 
versus 4.21. This order-of-magnitude difference is consistent across individual episodes 
(as Table 2 above highlights for some well-known cases).  It is also consistent across 
regions (Figure 4) and time.   15
Obviously, if domestic debt were trivial, then the frequency distribution of the 
total debt ratio at the time of default should overlap that of domestic debt.  This is hardly 
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Finally, we note that domestic debt is not static around default episodes.  In fact, 
domestic debt often shows the same frenzied increases in the run-up to external default as 
foreign borrowing does.  The pattern is illustrated in Figure 5, which depicts debt 
accumulation during the five years up to and including external default across all the 
episodes in our sample. 
Presumably, the comovement of domestic and foreign debt is produced by the 
same procyclical behavior of fiscal policy documented by previous researchers.
13   As 
shown repeatedly over time, emerging market governments are prone to treating 
                                                 
12 For example, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis that the two frequency distributions 
are equal at the 1% level. 
13 See Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) for evidence on procyclical 
macroeconomic policies.  See also Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) for a model in which the procyclical 
behavior of the current account can be rationalized by the high ratio of permanent to transitory shocks in 
emerging markets.    16
favorable shocks as permanent, fueling a spree in government spending and borrowing 
that ends in tears.
14   Figure 5 does not continue past the default date T.  If it did, we 
would see that countries often continue to run up domestic public debt after they are shut 
off from international capital markets.  
Figure 5.  The Runup in Domestic and External Debt



















Sources: See Data Appendices I and II in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
 
Domestic debt often builds up in the aftermath of external defaults. The case of 
pre-communist China is a caricature of the typical post-default trajectory. China’s 
government depended almost exclusively on external debt until two major defaults in 
1921 and 1939, with public domestic debt exploding in the aftermath of both incidents. 
By the mid-1940s, China’s government relied almost exclusively on domestic debt. 
 
                                                 
14 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) argue that there are strong parallels between today’s emerging markets and 
the behavior of today’s rich countries when they were at the same stage of development.   17
V. Domestic Debt in High-Inflation Episodes: Again a Missing Link? 
  Another literature that has by and large ignored domestic debt is the empirical 
literature on high and hyperinflation.  Ever since Cagan (1956), researchers have 
concentrated on the government’s incentives to gain seignorage revenues off the 
monetary base.
15  Indeed, a recurring paradox in this literature is why governments 
sometimes seem to inflate above and beyond the seignorage-maximizing rate.  Many 
clever and plausible answers have been offered to this question, with issues of time 
consistency and credibility featuring prominently.  We submit, however, that the presence 
of significant domestic public debt may be a major overlooked factor, especially 
considering—as we have already discussed—that a large share of debt was often long 
term and non-indexed.  We do not refer simply to the study of rare hyperinflation 
episodes but equally to the much more common phenomenon of high and moderately 
high inflation as studied, for example, by Dornbusch and Fischer (1986) and many others 
since.   
  Although there are literally hundreds of empirical papers on inflationary finance 
in developing countries and post-conflict economies, domestic debt is rarely mentioned, 
much less employed in time-series analysis.  As in the external debt literature, the 
implicit assumption is that domestic public debt is relatively unimportant.  But is this a 
good approximation?  Perhaps the answer is yes in some cases, but as Table 3 suggests, 
there are many important episodes where domestic debt appears to have been a major 
                                                 
15 Sargent (1982) does include data on central bank holdings of treasury bills for the five post–World War I 
countries (Austria, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) in his classic paper.  But of course, these 
debts are essentially a wash on the consolidated government balance sheet.   18
factor in the government’s incentive to inflate, if not indeed the dominant one.
16  Thus a 
comparison of actual inflation rates to any hypothetical “seignorage-maximizing rate,” 
calculated only off the monetary base, may often be beside the point.  
  We see in Table 3, for example, that when post–World War I inflation first spiked 
up to 66 percent in Germany in 1920, domestic debt was almost triple the size of the 
monetary base.  In the case of Brazil, debt was almost 20 times the size of the money 
base.
17 
  The importance of domestic debt is hardly confined to hyperinflations.  Table 3 
lists a number of high-inflation episodes as well.  Domestic public debt was almost 80 
percent of total domestic liabilities (including currency) in 1945 Japan, when inflation 
went over 500 percent.  In all of the cases listed in Table 3, domestic public debt is at 
least the same order of magnitude as the monetary base (with the exception of Norway in 
1918, where it was slightly below). 
Precise calculations of how much governments gained by inflating down the real 
value of debt require considerably more information on the maturity structure and interest 
payments than is available in our cross-country data set.  One also needs to understand 
bank reserve requirements, interest rate regulations, the degree of financial repression, 
and other constraints to make any kind of precise calculation.  But the fact that domestic 
nominal debt is so large compared to base money across so many important high-
                                                 
16  Of course, the possibility of using unanticipated inflation to default on nominal debt is well understood 
in the theoretical literature, e.g.,  Barro (1983). 
17 The Brazil case is exceptional in that some of the debt was indexed to inflation, although lags in the 
indexation scheme still made it possible for the government to largely inflate away the debt with a high 
enough rate of inflation.  Indeed, this appears to be exactly what happened as the country lurched in and out 
of hyperinflation for many years.   19
inflation episodes suggests that this factor needs to be given far more attention in future 
studies.
18 
VI:  Who Is Senior? Domestic Residents or Foreigners? 
  We have shown that domestic debt is large in general, and in many episodes of 
external default or high inflation, in particular.   Clearly, in trying to understand how 
crises play out, it would be helpful to better understand the relative seniority of domestic 
and foreign debt.  This section is an attempt to provide a first pass at some key 
characteristics of the data. Clearly, the answer is going to differ across countries and 
time.  Many factors, such as central bank independence and exchange rate regime, are 
likely going to be relevant.  Nevertheless, a few simple comparisons of the trajectory of 
output and inflation during the run-up and aftermath to domestic and external defaults are 
revealing.
19  
Our calculations can be taken only as suggestive for several reasons.  One is 
simply that, as we have already emphasized, there is no comprehensive database on overt 
domestic debt defaults prior to our own, much less on de facto defaults.  While we are 
confident that we have a relatively complete picture of external defaults and episodes of 
high inflation in our sample, we simply do not know how many domestic default 
episodes we may have missed, even restricting attention to de jure defaults.  Appendix I 
provides a broad indication of how hidden in the historical archives are clear episodes of 
                                                 
18 Calvo and Guidotti (1992) develop a model of the optimal maturity structure of nominal debt, where the 
government trades off flexibility (the option to inflate away long-term debt when under financial duress) 
versus maintaining high credibility for maintaining a low inflation rate (achieved by having very short-term 
debt which is more difficult to inflate away). 
19 It should also be noted that other economic indicators (besides inflation and per capita GDP growth, 
which we examine in detail) would provide a richer answer to the broad question of how bad conditions 
have to be before contemplating default (specifically, the impacts of domestic versus foreign default on 
social indicators relating to poverty, health, income distribution, etc., are bound to be quite different).   20
domestic default or restructuring.  Thus, our list of domestic defaults is surely a lower 
bound on the actual incidence.
  
Table 3. Inflation and Domestic Debt: Selected Episodes, 1917–1994 










Some Hyperinflations  
Argentina 1989  3079.5 25.6 16.4  61.2
Brazil 1987  228.3 164.9 9.8  94.4
 1990  2947.7 155.1 7.1  95.6
Germany 1920  66.5 52.6 19.4  73.0
 1923  22220194522.37 0.0 0.0  1.0
High Inflations
 
Greece 1922  54.2 53.0 34.3 60.7
 1923  72.6 41.3 32.7  55.9
Italy 1917  43.8 79.1 24.1  76.6
 1920  56.2 78.6 23.5  77.1
Japan 1944  26.6 236.7 27.8  89.5
 1945  568.1 266.5 74.4  78.2
Norway 1918  32.5 79.3 86.4  47.9
 1920  18.1 106.9 65.6  62.3
Philippines 1981  13.1 10.4 6.6  61.1
 1984  46.2 11.0 13.9  44.2
Turkey 1990  60.3 14.7 7.4  66.6
 1994  106.3 20.2 7.1  73.9
Sources:  See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, Appendix I). Money and Debt stock refer to levels at the 
beginning of each episode. 
 
Finally, but worthy of discussion, our approach is systematic in documenting the 
incidence of default but it is silent on assessing the magnitude of default.  Even though 
our new database on public debt can provide a valuable insight on the magnitudes 
involved in the original default or restructuring, it would be a stretch of the imagination 
to suggest that these data provide a snapshot of the subsequent restructuring nuances or 
the actual recovery rates.  With these caveats in mind, a number of results stand out.  
 
   21
The antecedents of domestic and external default 
First, how bad are macroeconomic conditions on the eve of default?  
Unambiguously, output declines in the run-up to default on domestic debt are typically 
significantly worse than for external debt.  As highlighted in Figure 6 and 7, the average 
cumulative decline in output during the three-year run-up to a domestic default crisis is 8 
percent.  The output decline on the year of the domestic debt crisis alone is 4 percent; the 
comparable average decline for the external debt events is 1.2 percent.  To compare the 
antecedents of the domestic and external defaults, we performed a variety of tests for 
individual years, as well as for the cumulative change in the window prior to default.  In 
the latter test, there are a total of 224 observations for domestic crises (that is, the number 
of annual observations in advance of domestic crises) and 813 for external crashes (again, 
years times number of crises).   
As noted earlier, the results have to be interpreted with care, as many domestic 
episodes are twin default crises and, as such, output is also suffering from limited access 
(if at all) to external credit.   22
Figure 6. Domestic and external crises
Level of real GDP, index t-4=100












Figure 7.  Real GDP: Domestic and external crises

















The comparable exercise for the inflation rate yields even starker differences  
(Figures 8 and 9); default through inflation goes hand in hand with domestic default—
before, during, and after the more explicit domestic expropriations.  The extensive   23
scholarly literature on inflation has been silent on this point.
20  Inflation during the year 
of external default is on average high, at 33 percent.
21  However, inflation truly gallops 
during domestic debt crises, averaging 170 percent in the year of the default.
22  After the 
domestic default, inflation remains at or above 100 percent in the following years.  We 
conclude that overt domestic default tends to occur only in times of severe 
macroeconomic distress. 
Figure 8. Domestic and external crises
Price level, index t-4=100













                                                 
20 Reinhart and Savastano (2003) do discuss the forcible conversion of foreign currency bank deposits (as 
in Argentina in 2002) during the hyperinflations in Bolivia and Peru (the dates of these episodes are listed 
in Appendix III. 
21 See the IMF’s World Economic Outlook. 
22 We have excluded Bolivia’s 1982 domestic default from these averages, as inflation peaks at over 11,000 
percent on the year before (t–1) the domestic default.   24
Figure 9.  Domestic and external crises













 and year of crisis
  
The incidence of domestic and external default 
To shed some light on the incidence of expropriation of residents versus 
nonresidents, we constructed four time series for the period 1800–2007:  the probability 
of external default (or the share of countries in our sample that are in external default in a 
given year); the comparable statistic for domestic default episodes; the probability of an 
inflation crisis (defined here as the share of countries in any given year during our more 
than 200-year sample where the annual rate of inflation exceeded 20 percent); and  the 
sum of the incidence of high inflation and domestic default, which summarizes the 
expropriation of the holdings of domestic residents.
23, 
24 
  Figure 10 shows the probability of external default versus the comparable statistic 
for domestic default either through inflation or explicit default.  For the early period 
                                                 
23 Details on the underlying macroeconomic data are given in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
24 The United States is, of course, the modern exception. Virtually all U.S. debt is domestic (as the Carter 
bonds have been extinguished), yet about 40 percent is held by nonresidents (mostly central banks and 
other official institutions), but it is dollar denominated. Thus, inflation in the United States would also 
affect nonresidents.   25
through World War II, the incidence of external default is higher.
25  Table 5 presents 
some summary statistics on the underlying data.  For 1800–1939, the probability of 
external default is about 20 percent versus 12 percent for domestic residents.  For the 
entire sample, there is no statistically significant difference in the incidence of default on 
locals versus foreigners.  With the widespread adoption of fiat money, inflation 
apparently became the more expedient form of expropriation.  As a result, the incidence 
of taxing locals increased after World War II.
26 
Figure 11 plots the probability of domestic default as a share of the probability of 
default.  A ratio above 0.5 implies domestics do worse, while one less than 0.5 implies 
foreigners do worse.   
Certainly, this admittedly very crude first pass at the evidence does nothing to 
dissuade our prior belief that domestic debt is often held by important political 
stakeholders in debtor countries, and cannot always be lightly dismissed as strictly junior 
debt. 
                                                 
25 The huge spike in external defaults in the 1820s owes to the much-studied first wave of sovereign 
defaults of the newly independent Latin American countries—but Greece and Portugal also defaulted at 
this time. 
26 See the memorandum item in Table 5.   26
Figure 10. Who is Expropriated 
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Figure 11. Composite Probability of Domestic Default as a Share of 



















In this paper, we provide an extensive new cross-country data set on a key 
macroeconomic variable that governments often manage to keep remarkably hidden from   27
view: domestic public debt.  We also present what we believe to be the first attempt at a 
cross-country international catalogue of historical defaults on domestic public debt, 
spanning two centuries and sixty-four countries. 
  Our first look at the data suggests that researchers need to revisit the empirical 
literature on the sustainability of external government debt and on government’s 
incentives to engage in high and hyperinflation, taking into account the newly uncovered 
data on domestic public debt.  Of course, how the overhang of domestic debt impacts 
inflation and external default will vary across episodes and circumstances. In some cases, 
the domestic debt is eliminated through high inflation, in other cases, governments 
default on external debt.   
How did domestic public debt in emerging markets fall off many economists’ 
radar screen?  Many researchers, aware only of difficulties that emerging markets had in 
issuing debt in the ultra-high-inflation 1980s and 1990s, simply believed that no one 
would ever voluntarily lend money to a kleptocratic emerging market government.  The 
logical implication was that such debt must not exist.  True, there are exceptions. Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990) consider a theoretical case where domestic debt is honored ahead of 
external debt.  But absent any data, or even any awareness of the one-time existence of 
significant quantities of domestic public debt in virtually every emerging market, these 
isolated examples have had no great impact on the mainstream academic or policy 
literature.
  
  Perhaps the most surprising and significant finding of our study is simply the lack 
of transparency so many governments and multilateral institutions exhibit in making time 
series on domestic debt easily available.   After all, these governments routinely tap   28
domestic and foreign markets to sell debt.  Standard auction theory—much of which is 
admittedly static—suggests that it should be in the interest of sellers to convey 
information, especially when the debt can be resold in secondary markets.  Even more 
puzzling is why global investors do not insist on historical information relevant to the 
value of securities they may purchase.  Understanding why so many governments do not 
make it easier for standard databases to incorporate their debt history is an important 
question for future research. 
From a policy perspective, there is a plausible case that an international agency 
would be providing a valuable public good if it could enforce (or at least promote) basic 
reporting requirements and transparency across countries.  Given the apparent large 
historical role of domestic public debt in helping to precipitate developing country 
external debt and inflation crises, it is a great curiosity indeed that today’s multilateral 
financial institutions have never fully taken up the task of systematically publishing the 
data.  This failure, especially in light of these agencies’ supposed role at the vanguard of 
warning policymakers and investors about crisis risks, is stunning.  Instead, the system 
has seemed to forget about the history of domestic debt entirely, thinking that today’s 
blossoming of internal public debt markets is something entirely new and different.
27  But 
as our historical data set on domestic debt underscores with surprising force, nothing 
could be further from the truth. 
                                                 
27 Beyond simply reporting debt data, international financial institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund or the World Bank can, of course, also help with disseminating best practices (see, for example, the 
institutional evolution discussed in Wallis and Weingast, 1988).   29
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Appendix I.  The  sample 
The debt data covers the countries shown in Appendix Table 1 (9 in Africa; 9 in 
Asia; 23 in Europe; 19 in Latin America, 2 in North America; and 2 in Oceania).  The 
domestic default episodes encompass all countries that have defaulted on their domestic 
debt (See Appendix Table 2 for a definition of default and Appendix Table 3 for a full list 
of the episodes). 
As the final column in Appendix Table 1 illustrates, our sample of sixty-four 
countries indeed accounts for about 90 percent of world GDP.  Many of these countries, 
particularly those in Africa and Asia, have become independent nations only relatively 





Appendix Table 1. Countries, Regions, and World GDP 
 
Country (An asterisk 
denotes no sovereign 
default or rescheduling 
history) 
 
Year of Independence 
 
 
Share of World Real GDP 
1990 International Geary-Khamis US dollars 
   1913  1990 
Africa     
Cote D’Ivoire  1960  0.00  0.06 
Egypt 1831  0.40  0.53 
Ghana 1957  0.06  0.06 
Kenya 1963  0.00  0.10 
Mauritius *  1968  0.00  0.03 
Morocco 1956  0.13  0.24 
South Africa  1910  0.36  0.54 
Tunisiaª 1881-1957
  0.06 0.10 
Zimbabwe 1965  0.00  0.05 
Asia     
China 1368  8.80  7.70 
India 1947 7.47  4.05 
Indonesia 1949  1.65  1.66 
Japan 1590  2.62  8.57 
Korea *  1945  0.34  1.38 
Malaysia *  1957  0.10  0.33 
Philippines 1947  0.34  0.53 
Singapore *  1965  0.02  0.16 
Thailand *  1769  0.27  0.94 
Europe     
Austria 1282  0.86  0.48 
Belgium *  1830  1.18  0.63 
Bulgaria 1878  0.26  0.18 
Czechoslovakia 1918  0.00  0.49 
Denmark *  980  0.43  0.35 
Finland *  1917  0.23  0.31 
France 943  5.29  3.79 
Germany 1618  8.68  4.67 
Greece 1829  0.32  0.37 
Hungary 1918  0.60  0.25 
Ireland 1922  0.44  0.15 
Italy 1569 3.49 3.42 
Netherlands *  1581  0.91  0.95 
Norway *  1905  0.22  0.29 
Poland 1918  1.70  0.72 
Portugal 1139  0.27  0.40 
Romania 1878  0.80  0.30 
Russia 1457  8.50  4.25 
Spain   1476  1.52  1.75 
Sweden *  1523  0.64  0.56 
Switzerland 1291  0.60  0.54 
Turkey   1453  0.67  1.13 
United Kingdom *  1066  8.22  3.49 
 
Sources:  Correlates of War (2007), Maddison (2004).  
Notes: An asterisk denotes no sovereign external default or rescheduling history; we do not include 
intergovernmental war loans such as the US loans to Great Britain during World War I. 
ªTunisia was a protectorate of France from 1881 to 1956.   35
 
 
Appendix II:  Domestic debt data 
  The central government debt data assembled in this study is both broad in its 
cross-country coverage and spans nearly one-hundred years for most countries (1914 to 
Appendix Table 1 (concluded). Countries, Regions, and World GDP 
 
 
Year of Independence    Share of World Real GDP 
     1990  International 
    Geary-Khamis  US  dollars 
   1913  1990 
Latin America     
Argentina 1816  1.06  0.78 
Bolivia 1825  0.00  0.05 
Brazil 1822  0.70  2.74 
Chile 1818 0.38  0.31 
Colombia 1819  0.23  0.59 
Costa Rica  1821  0.00  0.05 
Dominican Republic  1845  0.00  0.06 
Ecuador 1830  0.00  0.15 
El Salvador  1821  0.00  0.04 
Guatemala 1821  0.00  0.11 
Haiti 1804 0.00  0.02 
Honduras 1821  0.00  0.03 
Mexico 1821  0.95  1.91 
Nicaragua 1821  0.00  0.02 
Panama 1903  0.00  0.04 
Paraguay 1811  0.00  0.05 
Peru 1821 0.16 0.24 
Uruguay 1811  0.14  0.07 
Venezuela 1830  0.12  0.59 
North America     
Canada *  1867  1.28  1.94 
United States *  1783  18.93  21.41 
Oceania     
Australia *  1901  0.91  1.07 
New Zealand *  1907  0.21  0.17 
 
Total Sample: 64 countries      93.5      89.9 
 
Sources: Correlates of War (2007), Maddison (2003). 
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2007) and even longer for many others.
28  Here we present a synopsis of “state-of-the-
art” information on public debt (available data, sources, scope, etc.).  We also highlight 
some of the salient characteristics of the long time series we study, in addition to what we 
have already discussed in section II of the text.
29  
Data preliminaries 
Government debt is among the most elusive of economic time series.  
For the advanced economies, the most comprehensive data comes from the 
OECD, which provides time series on general government debt since 1980.  However, 
this data has several important limitations: it only includes a handful of emerging 
markets; for many advanced economies (France, Finland, Greece, and the U.K., to name 
a few) the data actually begins much later (in the 1990s), which cannot be considered as 
much of a time series; and only total debt is reported, with no particulars provided for the 
composition of debt (domestic versus foreign) or its maturity (long-term versus short-
term).  To state that the IMF’s well-known World Economic Outlook (WEO) database 
extends to public debt requires a stretch of the imagination.
30  Data is only provided for 
the G-7 from 1980 onwards (out of 183 countries covered in the WEO).   
The most comprehensive data on public debt in emerging market economies 
comes from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance—GDF (known previously 
as the World Debt Tables).  It is an improvement on other databases in that it begins (for 
most countries) in 1970 and provides extensive detail on the particulars of external debt.  
                                                 
28 The regional coverage is, unfortunately, uneven: coverage of Africa is relatively sparse (although we 
incorporate some excellent data from colonial records); it is, of course, most complete for Europe, North 
America, and Oceania. 
29 For compete references underlying this appendix and its accompanying database, see Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008). 
30 This description comes from the IMF’s web site “Download time series data for GDP growth, inflation, 
unemployment, payments balances, exports, imports, external debt, capital flows, commodity prices, 
more.”   37
Yet, GDF also has serious limitations, besides the fact that it covers only external debt.  
Neither advanced economies are included to facilitate comparisons, nor are such newly 
industrialized countries as Israel, Korea, or Singapore.  Unlike data from the IMF and the 
World Bank for exchange rates, prices, government finances, etc., there is no data prior to 
1970.  For a few countries, such as Panama or Cote D’Ivoire, external debt is a sufficient 
statistic on government liabilities, because domestic public debt levels are relatively 
trivial.  For most countries, however, domestic debt accounts for an important share of 
total government debt.  As we have already noted in the text, the all-country average 
oscillates between 40 to 80 percent during 1900 to 2006.
31 
In search of the elusive data on total public debt, we examined the archives of the 
League of Nations and found that the institution collected information on, among other 
things, public domestic and external debt in its Statistical Yearbook (1926–1944).  While 
neither the IMF nor the World Bank continued this practice after the war, the newly 
formed United Nations (UN) inherited the data collected by the League of Nations.  In 
1948, the UN Department of Economic Affairs published a special volume on public debt 
that spanned 1914 to 1946.  From that time onwards, the UN continued to collect and 
publish the domestic and external debt data in the same format as their prewar 
predecessor on an annual basis in their Statistical Yearbooks.  As former colonies became 
independent nations, the database expanded accordingly.  This practice continued until 
1983, at which time the domestic and external public debt series were discontinued.  In 
total, these sources yield time series that span 1914 to 1983 for the most complete cases.  
It covers advanced and developing economies.  For the most part, it also disaggregates 
                                                 
31  For some countries, such as the Netherlands, Singapore, and the United States, practically all public debt 
is domestic.   38
domestic debt into its long-term and short-term components.  To the best of our 
knowledge, these data are not available electronically in any database.  Hence obtaining it 
required going to the original publications.  These data provide the starting point for our 
public debt series, which have been extended to the period prior to 1914 and post 1983 
whenever possible.  The sources are numerous.  The material comes from large-scale 
historical statistical compendiums (such as Carreras and Tafunell, 2005, Estadísticas 
Históricas de España, Siglos XIX-XX) or from individual scholars (for example, Bazant’s, 
1968, careful study of Mexico’s domestic and foreign debt, Historia de la Deuda 
Exterior de Mexico: 1823-1946).  Colonial records were also a valuable source of 
information for pre-1914; country-specific statistical and government agencies provide 
data for the more recent period.
32  Data Appendix IV provides details for the sources by 
country and time period.  Foreign external debt is from Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).   
Appendix III: Crises dates 
Appendix Table1 defines the criteria as to what constitutes a domestic debt crisis. 
Specifically, as with sovereign default it is defined as:  
1.  A failure to meet a principal or interest payment on the due date (or within the 
specified grace period).  (These episodes also include instances where rescheduled debt is 
ultimately extinguished on less favorable terms.) 
2.  The freezing of bank deposits and or forcible conversions of such deposits from 
dollars to local currency. 
3.  The abrogation of indexation clauses, as the United States did in the 1930s and as 
Argentina is doing at the time of this writing in 2008. 
                                                 
32 For Australia, Ghana, India, Korea, South Africa among others, we have put together debt data for much 
of the colonial period from British statistical sources which tracked the colonies. We also have similar 
colonial data for former Japanese colonies.   39
To our knowledge, this is the first effort to chronicle systematically sovereign defaults on 
domestic debts, along the lines that economic historians have documented external 
sovereign defaults.  The closest source comparable to these dates on domestic sovereign 
default is Standard and Poor’s.
33  
For a detailed description of all other data used in this study by country and by 
year see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
                                                 
33 See the careful analysis of Beers and Chambers, Sovereign Defaults At 26-Year Low, To Show Little 
Change In 2007, which covers domestic default post-1975. Since this study is focused only on domestic 
public debt, it does miss some key episodes, such as forcible conversions of foreign currency bank deposits.  
These episodes constitute defaults on domestic debt because, typically, the government simultaneously 
writes down the value of treasury debt held by banks. 
 
Appendix Table 2. Defining Debt Crises by Events:  A Summary 
 
Type of Crisis 
 






A sovereign default is defined as the 
failure to meet a principal or interest 
payment on the due date (or within the 
specified grace period).  The episodes 
also include instances where 
rescheduled debt is ultimately 
extinguished in terms less favorable 
than the original obligation. 
While the time of default is accurately 
classified as a crisis year there are a large 
number of cases where the final resolution 
with the creditors (if it ever did take place) 
seems interminable.  For this reason we also 
work with a crisis dummy that only picks up 
the first year. 
Debt crisis: 
Domestic 
The definition given above for external 
debt applies.  In addition, domestic debt 
crises have involved the freezing of 
bank deposits and or forcible 
conversions of such deposits from 
dollars to local currency. 
There is at best some partial documentation 
of recent defaults on domestic debt provided 
by Standard and Poor’s. Historically, it is 
very difficult to date these episodes and in 
many cases (such as banking crises), it is 
impossible to ascertain the date of the final 
resolution.   40
Appendix Table 3. Episodes of Domestic Debt Default or Restructuring, 1750–1920 
Country Dates  Commentary 
Argentina  1890  This default also extended to several so-called 
“internal” bonds. These bonds although not issued 
in London, were denominated in a foreign currency 
(£s) and marketed abroad—the forerunners of the 
Mexican Tesobonos of the 1990s. 
China March  1921  Consolidated  internal debt plan to deal with the 
arrears on most government bonds since 1919. 
Denmark  January 1813  During the crisis, foreign debts were serviced but 
domestic debt was reduced by 39 percent. 
Mexico  November 30, 1850  After the restructuring of foreign debt in October of 
that year, domestic debt was roughly cut in half. 
Domestic debt accounted for 60 percent of total 
public debt. 
Peru  1850  Domestic colonial debts were not cancelled—debt 
prices collapsed and this debt was only restructured 
in 1850. 
Russia December  1917–October 1918  Repudiation of debts and confiscation of gold in all 
forms followed by confiscation of all foreign 
exchange. 
United Kingdom  1749, 1822, 1834, 1888–89  Among several conversions of debt into lower 
coupon rates.  Reductions in rates were mostly 0.5–
1.0 percent in these episodes.  
United States  January 1790  Nominal interest was maintained at 6 percent, but a 
portion of the interest was deferred for 10 years. 
United States (9 
states) 
1841–1842  Three states repudiated their debts altogether. 
United States 
(states and many 
local 
governments) 
1873–83 or 1884  By 1873, 10 states were in default.  In the case of 
West Virginia, settlement was as late as 1919. 
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Appendix Table 3. Selected Episodes of Domestic Debt Default or Restructuring, 1930s–1950s 
Country Dates  Commentary 
Bolivia 1927  Arrears  of  interest lasted until at least 1940. 
Canada (Alberta)  April 1935  The only province to default—which lasted for about 10 
years. 
China  1932  First of several “consolidations”, monthly cost of 
domestic service was cut in half. Interest rates were 
reduced to 6 percent (from over 9 percent)—amortization 
periods were about doubled in length. 
Greece  1932  Interest on domestic debt was reduced by 75 percent since 
1932; Domestic debt was about 1/4 of total public debt. 
Mexico  1930s  Service on external debt was suspended in 1928.  During 
the 1930s, interest payments included “arrears of 
expenditure and civil and military pensions.” 
Peru  1931  After suspending service on external debt on May 29, 
Peru made “partial interest payments” on domestic debt. 
Romania  February 1933  Redemption of domestic and foreign debt is suspended 
(except for three loans). 
Spain  October 1936–April 1939  Interest payments on external debt were suspended, 
arrears on domestic debt service. 
United States  1933  Abrogation of the gold clause. In effect, the U.S. refused 
to pay Panama the annuity in gold due to Panama 
according to a 1903 treaty. The dispute was settled in 
1936 when the US paid the agreed amount in gold 
balboas. 
United Kingdom  1932  Most of the outstanding WWI debt was consolidated into 
a 3.5 percent perpetual annuity. 
Uruguay  November  1, 1932–February, 
1937 
After suspending redemption of external debt on January 
20, redemptions on domestic debt were equally 
suspended. 
Austria  December 1945  Restoration of schilling (150 limit per person). Remainder 
placed in blocked accounts. In December 1947, large 
amounts of previously blocked schillings invalidated and 
rendered worthless. Temporary blockage of 50 percent of 
deposits. 
Germany  June 20, 1948  Monetary reform limiting 40 Deutschemark per person.  
Partial cancellation and blocking of all accounts. 
Japan  March 2, 1946–1952  After inflation, exchange of all bank notes for new issue 
(1 to 1) limited to 100 yen per person.  Remaining 
balances were deposited in blocked accounts. 
Russia  1947  The monetary reform subjected privately held currency to 
a 90 percent reduction. 
  April 10, 1957  Repudiation of domestic debt (about 253 billion rubles at 
the time). 
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Appendix Table 3. Selected Episodes of Domestic Debt Default or Restructuring, 1970–2007 (concluded) 
Country Dates  Commentary 
Africa 
Angola 1976,  1992–2002   
Cameroon 2004   
Congo (Kinshasa)  1979   
Gabon 1999–2005   
Ghana  1979, 1982  Default on central bank notes (in the context of 
conversion to a new currency). 
Liberia 1989–2006   
Madagascar 2002   
Mozambique 1980   
Rwanda  1995  No external default. 
Sierra Leone  1997–1998   
Sudan 1991   
Asia 
Mongolia 1997–2000   
Myanmar 1984,  1987   
Sri Lanka  1996  No external default. 
Solomon Islands  1995–2004   
Vietnam 1975   
Europe and the Middle East 
Croatia 1993–1996   
Kuwait 1990–1991   
Russia  1998–1999  Largest local currency debt default (US $39 billion) since 
Brazil 1990. 





Argentina  1982, 1989–90, 2002–2005  Forcible conversion of U.S. dollar debt to peso debt. 
Bolivia  1982  U.S. dollar deposits were forcibly converted into local 
currency.  Foreign currency deposits were again allowed 
in 1985 as part of the stabilization plan when capital 
controls were lifted. 
Brazil  1986–87, 1990  Abrogation of inflation-linked indices embedded in the 
original contracts. Largest default (US$ 62 billion) in 
1990. 
Dominica 2003–2005   
Dominican Republic  1975–2001   
Ecuador 1999   
El Salvador  1981–1996  The only case in Latin America where there was a default 
in domestic debt that was NOT accompanied by external 
default. 
Grenada 2004–2005   
Mexico  1982  Forcible conversion of dollar deposits to pesos. 
Panama  1988–1989  Arrears in domestic suppliers’ credit, wages, and civil and 
military pensions. 
Peru  1985  U.S. dollar deposits were forcibly converted into local 
currency.  Foreign currency deposits were allowed again 
in 1988.   
Surinam 2001–2002   
Venezuela 1995–1997,  1998   
Zimbabwe  2006  With over 98.5 percent of domestic debt with maturities 
less than a year, there is a restructuring. 
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Appendix Figure 1 plots for the years 1900–2006 (where our data set is most 
complete) the percentage of all independent countries in a state of default or restructuring 
on domestic sovereign debt during any given year.  One fact that jumps out from the 
figure are the two long periods where a higher percentage of all countries are in a state of 
default or restructuring.  Like banking crises (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008), domestic 
debt crises are bunched during the Great Depression of the 1930s and debt crises which 
began in the early 1980s.   
Appendix Figure 1 
Sovereign Domestic Debt: 1900-2006
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Appendix IV.  Public Debt: Detailed Sources  
 
This data appendix covers the government debt series used, while Appendix I is devoted 
to the database on macro time series. 
 
Abbreviations of  frequently used sources (additional sources listed in tables below): 
 
CLYPS: Cowan, Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, Sturzenegger 
ESFDB:  European State Finance Data Base 
GFD: Global Financial Data, The World Bank 
IFS:  International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
LM: Lindert & Morton 
LofN: League of Nations 
MAR: Marichal 
MIT: Mitchell 
RR: Reinhart and Rogoff 
UN: United Nations 
WEO: World Economic Outlook, IMF 
Lcu: local currency units 
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Appendix Table 4 Domestic Public Debt 
(Local currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Argentina  1863–1971 Garcia  Vizcaino  Lcu 
  1914–1981 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980–2005  GFD, Jeanne & Guscina   
Australia  1914–1981 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1980–2007  Australian  Office  of 
Financial Management 
Lcu 
Austria  1945–1984 UN  Lcu 
  1970–2006 Austrian  Federal 
Financing Agency 
euros 
Belgium  1914–1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1992–2007 BNB,  Centre  d'études 
économiques de la KUL 
 
Bolivia  1914–1953 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1968–1981    
  1991–2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Brazil  1923–1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1991–2005  GFD, Jeanne & Guscina   
Canada  1867–2007  Statistics Canada, Bank 
of Canada 
Lcu 
Chile  1827–2000  Diaz et al.  Lcu 
  1914–1953 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1914–1946  UN   
  1990–2007  Ministerio de Hacienda  US$ 
China  1894–1949  RR (from Cheng, 
Huang, UN) 
Lcu 
    
Colombia  1923–2006  Contraloria General de 
la Republica 
Lcu 
Costa Rica  1892–1914 Soley-Guell  Lcu 
  1914–1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980–2007 CLYPS,  Ministerio  de 
Hacienda 
US$ 
Cote D’Ivoire  1970–1980 UN  Lcu 
Denmark  1914–1975 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990–2007 Denmark’s  National 
Bank 
Lcu 
Dominican Republic  1914–1952 LofN/UN  Lcu 
Ecuador  1914–1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990–2006  Ministry of Finance  US$ 
Egypt  1914–1959 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  2001–2005  Ministry of Finance  Lcu 
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Appendix Table 4. Domestic Public Debt, continued 
(Local currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
France  1913–1972 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1999–2007  Ministère du Budget, 
des comptes public 
Lcu 
Greece  1920–1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1912–1941 UN   
Guatemala  1921–1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980–2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Honduras  1914–1971 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1980–2005   US$ 
Hungary  1913–1942 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1992–2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
India  1840–1920 Statistical  Abstract 
relating to British India 
 
  1913–1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980–2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Indonesia  1972–1983 UN  Lcu 
  1998–2005 Bank  Indonesia/GFD   
Italy  1880–1913  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914–1894 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1882–2007 Dipartamento  del 
Tesoro 
Lcu 
Japan  1872–2007  Historical Statistics of 
Japan/Bank of Japan 
Lcu 
  1914–1946 UN   
Kenya  1961–1980 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1997–2007  Central Bank of Kenya  Lcu 
Korea  1970–1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1990–2004  Jeanne & Guscina  Lcu 
Malaysia  1947–1957 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1976–1981    
  1980–2004  Jeanne & Guscina   
Mauritius  1970–1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1998–2007  Bank of Mauritius  Lcu 
Mexico  1814–1946 Bazant  Not continuous 
 1914–1979  LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980–2006  Direccion General de la 
Deuda Publica 
 
Morocco  1965–1980 UN  Lcu 
Netherlands  1880–1914  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1914–1977 LofN/UN  Lcu 
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Appendix Table 4. Domestic Public Debt, continued 
(Local currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
New Zealand  1858–2006 Statistics  New 
Zealand/NZ Treasury 
Lcu 
Nicaragua  1914–1945 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1970–1983    
  1991–2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Norway  1880–1914  Flandreau & Zumer  Lcu 
  1913–1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1965–2007  Ministry of Finance  Lcu 
Panama  1915–1983 LofN/UN  US$ 
  1980–2005 CLYPS  US$ 
Paraguay  1927–1947 
1976–1982 
LofN/UN Lcu 
  1990–2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Peru  1918–1970 LofN/UN  Lcu 
 1990–2005  CLYPS  US$ 
Philippines  1948–1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980–2005  GFD, Jeanne & Guscina   
Poland  1920–1947 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1994–2004  Jeanne & Guscina  Lcu 
Portugal  1851–1997 INE-Portugese 
Statistical Agency  
Lcu 
 1914–1975  LofN/UN    Lcu 
  1980–2007  Banco de Portugal  In euros from 1999 
Russia  1922–1938 LofN/UN    Lcu 
  1993–2005  Jeanne & Guscina   
Singapore  1969–1982 UN  Lcu 
  1986–2006 Monetary  Authority  Lcu 
South Africa  1859–1914 Page  UK  pounds 
  1910–1983 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1946–2006 South  Africa  Reserve 
Bank 
Lcu 
Spain  1850–2001 Estadisticas  Historicas 
de España: Siglos XIX-
XX 
Lcu 
  1999–2006  Banco de España  Euro 
Sri Lanka  1950–1983 UN  Lcu 
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Appendix Table 4. Domestic Public Debt, concluded 
(Local currency units unless otherwise noted) 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Sweden  1914–1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1950–2006 Riksgälden Lcu 
Thailand (Siam)  1913–1984 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1980–2006  Jeanne & Guscina, Bank 
of Thailand 
Lcu 
    
Tunisia  1972–1982 UN  Lcu 
  2004–2007  Central Bank of Tunisia  Lcu 
Turkey  1933–1984 LofN/UN    Lcu 
 1986–2007  Turkish  Treasury  US$ 
United Kingdom  1914–2007 LofN/UN  Lcu 
United States  1791–2007 Treasury  Direct  Lcu 
Uruguay  1914–1947 
1972–1984 
LofN/UN Lcu 
  1980–2004 CLYPS  US$ 
Venezuela  1914–1982 LofN/UN  Lcu 
  1983–2005  Jeanne & Guscina  Lcu 
Zimbabwe  1969–1982 UN  Lcu 
 
 